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I. INTRODUCTION
On numerous websites users can find 3D printable items bearing 
unauthorized trademarks owned by others. Among the countless 
available items are phone cases,1 key chains,2 action figures,3 and 
models of vehicles and spaceships4 from movies. 
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Denver Law School, Associate Professor, Campbell
University School of Law. The author would like to thank Bernard Chao, Kristelia Garcia, Deborah
Gerhardt, Viva Moffat, and Harry Surden for their helpful comments. Thanks are also in order for
the faculty of the University of Akron School of Law for hosting a wonderful event.
1. Iphone Case, THINGIVERSE (June 4, 2015), http://www.thingiverse.com/thing:864824. 
2. Apple Logo and Keychain, THINGIVERSE (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thingiverse.com/
thing:595565. 
3. A Darth Vader from Star Wars can be found here: Low Poly Darth Vader, YOUMAGINE,
https://www.youmagine.com/designs/low-poly-darth-vader (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
4. Millenium Falcon, THINGIVERSE (June 3, 2016), http://www.thingiverse.com/
thing:1598269. 
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All fun and games with cute toys, right? Probably not—at least not to the 
rights holders of the intellectual property (IP) depicted in the objects. 
Indeed, under the Lanham Act, rights holders have sued to enjoin sellers 
of physical objects like phone cases containing their trademarks5 and toy 
versions of cars depicted in TV shows.6 Under current trademark law, 
the sale of a physical item that, without authorization, bears another’s 
trademark is generally an act of infringement.7 But as more commerce 
moves into the realm of digital bits, laws built around a world of atoms 
will be challenged. Issues are likely to proliferate as 3D printing 
continues to mature and methods of printing in an increasing variety of 
materials become possible. People can already print shoes,8 handbags 
and accessories,9 magnets,10 tools,11 circuits,12 and even buildings.13 
5. Some Chanel Phone Case Covers are Oh So Faux, A PREPONDERANCE OF FASHION
(Mar. 2015), http://www.apreponderanceoffashion.com/fashion-law/chanel-sues-chanel-phone-
case-copycats/. Chanel, Inc. v. Shop Jeen, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-09861 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 15, 2014) 
(case resolved through settlement); Shop Jeen Settled Suit with Chanel, is Flattered to Have Been 
Sued, THE FASHION LAW (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/shop-jeen-settled-
suit-with-chanel-is-flattered-to-have-been-sued.  
6. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (granting Lanham
Act protection to the “General Lee” car as depicted in “The Dukes of Hazzard” TV show and 
indicating defendant’s toy version of the car would generate confusion as to manufacture or 
sponsorship). 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2016). 
8. Our Story, FEETZ, http://feetz.com/story (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (describing a 3D
printing shoe store); The Future of Running is Here, NEW BALANCE (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.newbalance.com/article?id=4041 (describing a shoe with a 3D printed insole).  
9. 3D Printing Purses, Belts and Other Pliable Fashion Accessories, INSTRUCTABLES,
http://www.instructables.com/id/3D-Printing-Purses-Belts-and-other-Pliable-Fashio/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2017) (describing 3D printed purse and accessories printed in pliable nylon); Bridget Butler 
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Trademark-based lawsuits will undoubtedly multiply. 
3D printing (also called additive manufacturing) technology will 
complicate these lawsuits, so it is imperative that courts understand the 
technology. Anything that can be 3D printed must first be created in a 
digital file that instructs the printer what to do.14 As with digital music 
files, users can copy and share 3D printing files with ease. When these 
digital files (sometimes referred to generically as CAD files) contain 
depictions of trademark- or trade dress-bearing goods, trademark owners 
will likely want to control the dissemination of such files.15 
Many courts today would be tempted to find that the seller of the 
digital file depicted above committed trademark infringement. Such a 
finding of infringement would be based on a property-centric view of 
trademark law that is divorced from traditional trademark policies 
focusing on consumer confusion and from more limited property 
perspectives that dominated before the mid-twentieth century. But 3D 
printing technology alters settled assumptions about manufacturing, 
design, and trademarks and thus precludes simplistic application of 
current trademark doctrine.16 An understanding of the technology and its 
Millsaps, Mixee Labs Produces Sleek, Sophisticated 3D Printed Line of Purses and Wallets (Jan. 
11, 2015), https://3dprint.com/36409/mixee-labs-3d-printed-purses/ (describing handbags printed in 
with interlocking plastic pieces). 
10. C. Huber, et al., 3D Print of Polymer Bonded Rare-Earth Magnets, and 3D Magnetic
Field Scanning With an End-User 3D Printer, 109 APPL’D PHYSICS LETTERS 162401 (2016); 
Revolutionary 3D Printed Magnets by Polymagnet, 3D-ERS (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.3ders.org/articles/20160324-revolutionary-3d-printed-magnets-by-correlated-
magnetics-can-change-engineering.html. 
11. Space Station 3-D Printer Builds Ratchet Wrench To Complete First Phase Of
Operations, NASA (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/
research/news/3Dratchet_wrench.  
12. Simon Fried, When 3D Printing Meets PCBs, EE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1329449. 
13. Michelle Starr, Dubai Unveils World’s First 3D-Printed Office Building, CNET (Mar.
25, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/news/dubai-unveils-worlds-first-3d-printed-office-building/; 
Michelle Starr, World’s First 3D-Printed Apartment Building Constructed in China, CNET (Jan. 
19, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/worlds-first-3d-printed-apartment-building-constructed-in-
china/. 
14. Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of
Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 559-60 (2014). For a more in-depth description of 3D 
printing, see id at 558-62. 
15. See, e.g., Press Release, Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on
Ethics and Regulation, GARTNER (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2658315 
(“The rapid emergence of this technology will also create major challenges in relation to intellectual 
property (IP) theft. Gartner predicts that by 2018, 3D printing will result in the loss of at least $100 
billion per year in IP globally.”). 
16. See Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 135 (2013) (describing how changes in technology releases implicit constraints on IP law and 
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potential favors trademark laws that support free competition and 
technologically-enabled growth. 
3D printing technology divides the processes of design and 
manufacturing. In doing so, it demystifies trademarks,17 especially as 
symbols of source. Manufacturing, which can be accomplished by 
anyone with access to the appropriate 3D printer, is commoditized and 
democratized. Product design is also democratized—it can be 
meaningfully accomplished by individuals using widely available 
software. Incentivizing quality manufacturing by brand owners becomes 
less important where manufacturing is in the hands of consumers.18 
Further, where brand owners are merely designers and not 
manufacturers, other IP regimes, including design patents, utility patents, 
and copyrights, exert primacy.19 Finally, for individuals who have wide 
access to files and manufacturing capability, trademarks increasingly 
connote the personal expression of the user more so than manufacturing 
source or affiliation.20 
At a more granular level, how people exchange 3D printing files 
introduces fundamental questions about the source and affiliation 
indications of trademarks. Given the context in which purchasers 
encounter 3D printable files, including website addresses, usernames 
associated with file creators, and even disclaimers, they are unlikely to 
understand trademarks appearing in the digital file as source, 
sponsorship, or affiliation designations.21 Instead, these marks provide 
an understood level of digital verisimilitude. 
Further, because the file sold is not used by the purchaser in public, 
post-sale confusion is generally inapplicable to the file. Commentators 
thus far have been unaware of this significant doctrinal challenge posed 
by 3D printing technology.22 The purchaser may print and then use the 
printed (physical) item in public, but that use cannot constitute post-sale 
confusion because the physical item is distinct from the file sold. The 
seller of the file is only liable, if at all, under an indirect infringement 
theory.23 
On the other hand, given the ease with which people can create and 
exchange design files, trademark law simultaneously becomes more 
can catalyze doctrinal changes to the law). 
17. Throughout this Article I will generally refer to trademarks as including trade dress.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. Id. 
20. See infra Section III.C.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See id. 
23. Id.
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important in a digital world. There will be contexts in which the selling 
of digital files should result in trademark infringement. The flood of 
design files increases the need for symbols to reduce search costs. But 
the symbols should be those source indicators that are actually material 
to consumers, such as the user name of the file creator or the website on 
which the file is available, rather than symbols appearing “inside” the 
digital file. 
Following this introduction, Part II situates current trademark 
doctrine in terms of its dramatic growth over the twentieth century and 
the Supreme Court’s quick succession of cases from 2000 to 2003 that 
pared back some of that growth. The analysis demonstrates the Court’s 
intense concern for proper boundaries in trademark and other IP law and 
for the maintenance of zones of competition uninhibited by IP claims. 
Part III harnesses the holdings and themes of those Supreme Court 
cases to dissect how trademark law doctrine and policy apply to 3D 
printing files. As previewed above, the analysis provides surprising 
results and demonstrates how 3D printing and other digital technology 
raise fundamental policy questions concerning the meaning and scope of 
source, sponsorship, and affiliation indication and, more broadly, 
trademark law’s role in a digital environment. In some ways trademark 
law may be more important, but in other ways less so. The analysis has 
implications not only for 3D printing files, but also for digital files 
generally. 
II. TRADEMARK BOUNDARIES AND BENEFICIAL COPYING
For centuries merchants applied marks to physical goods to indicate 
a source of manufacturing.24 Over time, the law has come to recognize 
that trademark law serves two primary and interrelated functions.25 First, 
it protects manufacturers’ incentives to invest in quality goods by 
preventing an imitator from adopting the same mark and thus diverting 
sales from the first manufacturer.26 Second, trademark law protects 
24. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 
265, 273-80 (1975); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1849-50 (2013) [hereinafter McKenna, Normative Foundations]. People have 
used marks for thousands of years to indicate ownership, such as branding cattle. See, e.g., 
Diamond, supra note 24, at 265-72. 
25. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 
(4th ed. 2013) (discussing the dual goals of trademark law to “protect both consumers from 
deception and confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff’s infringed trademark as 
property”). 
26. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“[T]rademarks 
foster . . . the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”); 
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consumers from deception by allowing a trademark to connote a specific 
(if anonymous) source, thus enhancing information quality on which 
consumers rely.27 In simple trademark infringement cases, the law 
simultaneously protects both the manufacturers’ and the consumers’ 
interests. For example, suppose I buy shoes bearing an Adidas logo 
because I believe the company that owns that trademark makes the 
shoes, and I have come over time to equate those shoes with good 
quality. If in fact the shoes I purchased are cheap counterfeits and I did 
not know it, I have been deceived into buying a cheap product. Further, I 
lose the ability to rely on the Adidas mark as a shortcut for preference. 
Finally, the true company that stands behind Adidas shoes is harmed 
because it lost a sale. 
To understand the doctrinal challenges of 3D printable files and 
trademark law, it is necessary to understand the recent expansions and 
contractions in trademark law. Situating 3D printable files within this 
narrative illuminates the modern understanding of trademark law’s 
normative goals and how digital files interact with them. 
The story of modern trademark law has mostly been one of 
expansion.28 Because this expansion is well-covered, I outline briefly 
only the expansions most relevant to 3D printing technology. A century 
ago, trademark infringement only occurred where goods competed 
directly with each other.29 As commerce grew more complex and brand 
owners licensed others to manufacture goods on their behalf, courts 
allowed trademark law to expand. By the early twentieth century, a few 
courts expanded trademark rights into related, but not directly competing 
goods.30 
see also McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1850-63 (discussing the historical 
trade-diversion focus of English and American trademark law). 
27. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166-68 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999). 
28. See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
427, 437-42 (2010); McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896 (“Courts, with some 
help from Congress, significantly broadened trademark law during the twentieth century.”); Mark 
A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1706–
07 (1999); Lunney, supra note 27. 
29. See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES, AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 4, at 15 (3d ed. 1917) (quoting DUNCAN M. KERLY, THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS, 
TRADE-NAME, AND MERCHANDISE MARKS 475 (2d ed. 1901)) (“The qualified right in the 
tradename [or a trademark], a right to prevent a defendant from passing off his goods as those of the 
plaintiff by the use of it—exists only with regard to goods of the kind for which the plaintiff uses it, 
and to which the connection with his business suggested by the use of the name extends.”). 
30. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
137, 146-47 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s]. 
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In the latter part of the twentieth century, courts expanded the law 
further and protected mark owners from uses of their marks on unrelated 
goods if the use would cause consumer confusion as to affiliation or 
sponsorship.31 Thus, for example, if I make baseball hats with my 
university’s trademarked logo, I can be guilty of trademark infringement 
regardless whether the university sells hats with its logo; merely the 
chance of “sponsorship confusion” prevents such uses. As has been 
observed, affiliation and sponsorship confusion have a circular 
component to them: one is more likely confused as to sponsorship or 
affiliation if the law protects such rights and conditions the public to 
expect them.32 Thus, sponsorship and affiliation confusion have the 
innate ability to self-perpetuate and metastasize. 
As a final example of trademark law expansion (to say nothing of 
dilution33), courts have found trademark infringement in cases where the 
purchaser knew the goods were fake at the time of purchase. These cases 
presented a conceptual problem because the law originally protected 
against only confusion at the point of sale.34 To circumvent this problem, 
courts adopted the doctrine of post-sale confusion, reasoning that third 
parties might be confused as to the authenticity of the item when they 
see a non-deceived purchaser wearing or using it.35 Courts apply this 
doctrine without requiring proof that the allegedly confused third parties 
would have ever bought the trademarked goods.36 
These various expansions can work together to expand the law even 
further. For instance, a trademark owner can combine affiliation 
31. See generally, Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) (discussing the recent vintage of 
merchandising claims). Congress amended the Lanham Act to acquiesce to sponsorship and 
affiliation confusion. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. I, sec. 132, § 
43(a), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1989). 
32. Lunney, supra note 27. 
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
34. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 469-75 (1999); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use
and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 798-99. 
35. The earliest such U.S. case is Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron &
Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955). The Mastercrafters court also 
was concerned that non-confused purchasers of the imitation clock would “acquir[e] the prestige [of 
appearing to own] a prestigious article.” Id. at 466. Prototypical cases involve shoppers at flea 
markets or other venues notorious for selling counterfeit goods. See, e.g., Omega SA v. 375 Canal, 
LLC, No. 12 Civ. 6979(PAC), 2013 WL 2156043 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (involving counterfeit 
sales); Colleen Jordan Orscheln, Bad News Birkins: Counterfeit in Luxury Brands, 14 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 249, 250-51 (2015) (discussing counterfeit sales). The purchasers know the 
goods are counterfeit, and thus are not confused. But when the purchaser later wears the goods in 
public, others may see. If, as is often the case, the goods are of inferior quality to the genuine goods, 
viewers may blame the poor quality on the owner of the brand displayed. 
36. Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53. 
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confusion with post-sale confusion to stop a person from selling a non-
competing good to a customer who is not confused as to affiliation or 
sponsorship.37 
After virtually unabated expansion throughout the twentieth 
century,38 early in the twenty-first century the Supreme Court decided 
three cases that dramatically pruned certain aspects of trademark law.39 
Although none of these decisions concerned printable files, each impacts 
them—at a minimum by signaling the Court’s interest in channeling 
claims to proper areas of IP law and invigorating a sphere of 
unencumbered competition with beneficial copying. 
First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,40 the Court 
wrestled with the law of trade dress protection. Spurred on in part by the 
Court’s own decisions, particularly its decision in Two Pesos that held 
trade dress can be inherently distinctive,41 trade dress protection 
strengthened dramatically in the 1990s.42 Wal-Mart represents a step to 
weaken trade dress protection in the troublesome area of product 
design.43 Samara sold a line of children’s clothing decorated with fruit 
37. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2010); see also Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53 (discussing 
the case). 
38. The Court itself contributed to the expansion at times. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (interpreting the Lanham Act to allow color alone to serve as a 
trademark/trade dress); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding 
that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, and if so, does not require proof of secondary 
meaning); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985) (interpreting the 
Lanham Act to mean that an infringement action based on an incontestable mark may not be 
defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive). 
39. The Court also decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), which
held that plaintiffs must show actual dilution, as opposed to a likelihood of dilution, in dilution 
claims. Congress overruled the Moseley decision in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006). 
40. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
41. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776. 
42. Dana Beldiman, Protecting the Form but Not the Function: Is U.S. Law Ready for a New
Model High Tech?, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 529 (2003) (“Pressured by systemic 
demands for stronger protection mechanisms, judicial decisions have dramatically broadened the 
scope of protection, in particular in the area of trade dress law.”); Gary Myers, Statutory 
Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark 
Dilution, Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 243 
(2000) (providing a table to show the expansion of trade dress litigation in the 1980s and 1990s and 
stating that, “[l]itigation concerning the subject matter and extent of protection available for . . . 
trade dress has increased considerably in recent years, particularly as trademark owners have 
become aware . . . of the generous protections that the Supreme Court accorded to trade dress in 
Two Pesos.”). 
43. Beldiman, supra note 42, at 563 (“The Wal-Mart ruling was prompted by the Court’s 
desire to stem the doctrinal expansion of the trade dress doctrine.”). 
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shapes. Believing that it had (unregistered) trade dress protection in the 
clothes’ designs, it sued Wal-Mart for selling “knockoffs” of the clothes. 
The specific issue on appeal was whether trade dress infringement could 
be found in the absence of proof of acquired distinctiveness (secondary 
meaning). 
To uphold its Two Pesos decision, the Wal-Mart Court 
distinguished between product packaging, which it said can be 
inherently distinctive, and product design, which it said cannot be.44 The 
Court offered no empirical evidence to justify its rule and instead 
nakedly asserted that with “product design, as in the case of color, we 
think consumer predisposition to equate the feature with the source does 
not exist.”45 
While others have rightly criticized the Court’s armchair consumer 
psychology, the error is largely harmless in that it simply involves 
defensible and familiar tradeoffs between a rule versus a standard. The 
overall thrust of the Court’s opinion was to choose the efficiency of a 
clear rule over the costs of a more searching standard to preserve a 
sphere of competition by imitation. The Court was rather transparent 
about this, stating that, “[c]ompetition is deterred, however, not merely 
by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given 
the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of 
allowing suit based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not 
worth the candle.”46 The Court felt that the harm to competition in the 
form of litigation costs (or threat of litigation costs) overwhelmed the 
relatively small gains to be had. 
Wal-Mart is important when thinking about printable files because 
it shows the Court’s attentiveness to litigation realities and willingness 
to make bright-line rules to achieve a healthy, competitive market.47 Of 
course any bright-line rule leaves a few individual cases outside of what 
might be considered traditional trademark protection, but the clarity and 
44. The Court also troublingly punted on the tough boundary between product packaging and
design. It asserted that the issue in Two Pesos, restaurant décor, was “either product packaging . . . 
or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the present case.” 
Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215. 
45. Id. at 213. 
46. Id. at 214 (emphasis added to show the Court did not assert that source-identifying 
product design was impossible). 
47. See id. at 213 (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with
regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law 
that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness. How easy it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of course, upon the clarity of the 
test for inherent distinctiveness, and where product design is concerned we have little confidence 
that a reasonably clear test can be devised.”). 
9
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efficiency can greatly outweigh the costs.48 The decision is also 
important for its discussion of channeling claims to the various branches 
of IP law. The Court noted that its bright-line rule should not cause 
significant harm to the product producer, “since the producer can 
ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is inherently source 
identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have secondary 
meaning, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the 
design . . . .”49 
The Court’s reference to design patent law highlights the IP regime 
responsible for encouraging ornamental design.50 Congress carefully 
balanced the tradeoffs of design protection against free competition with 
the design patent regime, and allowing trademark law (in the form of 
trade dress protection) to further incentivize ornamental design would 
upset the delicate balance. It would also ask something new of trademark 
law, which traditionally was not used to incentivize creative designs. 
Although the Court allowed trade dress protection even if the product 
enjoyed design patent protection, it did so only where the secondary 
meaning in the product’s shape clearly triggered trademark law’s 
overarching consumer confusion principle.51 Because secondary 
meaning is difficult to prove,52 the Court left open only a very narrow 
door.53 
A second Supreme Court decision, issued just one year after Wal-
Mart, further weakened trademark law (particularly trade dress law) and 
brightened the line between the branches of IP law. In TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,54 the Court reviewed a claim of trade dress 
protection in a dual spring design for roadside signs. The dual spring at 
the base of the signs had been the subject of a utility patent (since 
48. See, e.g., Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 St. LOUIS U. L.J. 
419, 421 (2011) (discussing the costs and benefits of rules versus standards). 
49. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 215. 
52. See, e.g., Loren Lunsford, Trade Dress in Product Design, MARTENSEN WRIGHT PC, 
http://martensenwright.com/da/trade-dress-product-design/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (“Secondary 
meaning in a product design is difficult to achieve.”); Vincenti & Vincenti, Wal-Mart and the 
Supreme Court’s Diminishment of Inherent Distinctiveness (Sep. 21, 2013), http://vincenti.com/wal-
mart-and-the-supreme-courts-diminishment-of-inherent-distinctiveness/ (noting the “difficult 
burden of establishing secondary meaning”).  
53. The Court further narrowed the opening by stating that when a court is unsure whether a
feature is product design or product packaging, “courts should err on the side of caution and classify 
ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart, 529 
U.S. at 215. 
54. 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001). 
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expired), and the accused infringer argued that the dual spring design 
could not constitute trade dress because it was functional.55 
The expired utility patent was of vital importance because utility 
patent law is the branch of IP responsible for incentivizing utilitarian 
inventions.56 The patent system represents a “carefully crafted bargain” 
between incentivizing new and non-obvious invention through patents, 
which limit competition through their exclusive rights, and allowing 
competition through copying, which dampens inventive endeavors.57 As 
part of that bargain, patents currently enjoy a term of twenty years from 
the date of filing.58 A longer patent term would increase the costs to 
society of monopoly pricing and impedance to follow-on technology.59 
The Court was intensely aware that patent holders may attempt to 
effectively extend protection past the twenty-year patent term by arguing 
that the utilitarian features enjoy trade dress protection.60 To prevent this 
usurpation of the congressional balance, the Court demarcated an 
expanse between utility patents and trade dress. Specifically, the Court 
held that a prior patent claiming a feature that is later asserted as trade 
dress constitutes strong evidence that the feature is functional and not 
protectable by trade dress.61 
TrafFix differs from Wal-Mart in an important way. Whereas Wal-
Mart envisioned trade dress protection might subsist after a design 
patent expired if the owner could demonstrate secondary meaning,62 
TrafFix reiterated that functional features can never enjoy trade dress 
protection, regardless of the existence of secondary meaning.63 In this 
instance at least, patent law trumps trademark law because the Court 
believed the harms to innovation outweigh any consumer confusion and 
loss to the would-be trade dress owner. 
At the same time, the Court seemingly refused to rule that utility 
patent protection for an object necessarily rendered the product 
55. Id. at 25. 
56. Lucas S. Osborn, Joshua M. Pearce & Amberlee Haselhuhn, A Case for Weakening
Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (2015). 
57. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 150-51 (1989); Osborn,
Pearce & Haselhuhn, supra note 56, at 1186-88. 
58. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015). 
59. Osborn, Pearce & Haselhuhn, supra note 56, at 1186-88. 
60. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28. 
61. Id. at 29-30. 
62. The Court stated, “We hold that, in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only 
upon a showing of secondary meaning.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
216 (2000). 
63. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35. 
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functional and thus ineligible for trade dress protection. Instead, the 
Court adopted a strong presumption that a feature claimed in a utility 
patent is functional.64 The lack of clarity from this presumption has 
engendered some criticism,65 but clearly the decision expanded the 
divide between utility patent and trade dress in two ways, one less 
significant and one more so. First, somewhat less significantly, it 
emphasized that the presumption was a “strong” one.66 While a strong 
presumption is not a precise rule, it sends a clear signal to lower courts 
that the divide between the two areas of IP law is important. Second, and 
more significantly, the opinion broadened the test for what counts as 
functional matter by clarifying (or reinterpreting) its earlier decisions to 
state that the primary test for utilitarian functionality is “when [the 
feature] is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects 
the cost or quality of the device.”67 This test is easier to meet than the 
alternate test, which asks whether the particular feature leads to a 
“significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”68 
The Court’s significant expansion of the test for utilitarian 
functionality and its strong presumption regarding previously patented 
features effectively erected a bar to trade dress protection for previously 
patented features. It is difficult to imagine a feature that was claimed in a 
patent ever escaping the presumption of functionality. Patent claims are 
highly technical, and every word in a claim limits the scope of the patent 
and reduces the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude others. Only a 
poor patent drafter would include a superfluous, non-utilitarian feature in 
a patent claim. 
In addition, the TrafFix Court built on Wal-Mart and amplified its 
attention to the desirability of competitive copying. Rather than viewing 
copying pejoratively as undesirable free-riding or theft, the Court 
emphasized that “unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or 
copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying” and noted that 
“copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which 
64. Id. at 29-30 (“A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the trade
dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional. If 
trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong evidence of functionality based on the 
previous patent adds great weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional 
until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.”). 
65. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix,
Moseley, and Dastar—The Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 237, 257 (2005) (“In short, without a categorical preclusion rule, it seems that the Court 
effectively elided answering the question before it . . . .”). 
66. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30. 
67. Id. at 33. 
68. Id. 
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preserve our competitive economy. Allowing competitors to copy will 
have salutary effects in many instances.”69 
In the end, the TrafFix Court emphasized and sharpened the core 
dividing principle between trademark law and patent law: if a feature is 
functional, it cannot enjoy trade dress protection, regardless of whether it 
designates source.70 In short, although confusion is the touchstone of 
trademark law, sometimes the law will permit confusion to avoid 
conflicting with other areas of IP law. 
Finally, a third case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp.,71 set further boundaries for trademark law. Dastar copied footage 
from Fox’s Crusade in Europe television series and reused portions of 
that footage in its own videos, crediting itself as the producer and 
distributor and providing no attribution to Fox.72 Fox alleged Dastar 
committed reverse passing off in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
by representing Fox’s content as its own.73 (Fox could not bring a 
copyright claim based on the Crusade series, because the copyright had 
lapsed.74) The Supreme Court rejected Fox’s claim, holding that “origin 
of goods” refers only to the “producer of the tangible goods that are 
offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or 
communication embodied in those goods.”75 In creating a distinction 
between tangible goods and the author of ideas, concepts, or 
communications, the Court was concerned that allowing claims for 
reverse passing off in the context of copyrightable works “would create 
a species of mutant copyright law” that would conflict with the Federal 
copyright regime.76 Moreover, the decision was not limited to concerns 
about overlap with copyright law; the justices also worried that § 43(a) 
might be used to “create[] a species of perpetual patent . . . .”77 
Others have written extensively about Dastar’s potentially dramatic 
scope.78 The decision is not limited to public domain works.79 Further, 
69. Id. at 29 (citation omitted). 
70. Id. at 29-30. 
71. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
72. Id. at 26-27. 
73. Id. at 28. 
74. Id. at 37. 
75. Id. at 37. 
76. Id. at 34 (“[A]llowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for [a representation that Dastar
originated the creative work in the videos] would create a species of mutant copyright law that 
limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use”‘ expired copyrights.”) (quoting Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 165 (1989)). 
77. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
78. See generally Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP.L. 357 (2012)
[hereinafter McKenna, Next Stand]. 
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though courts offer mixed results, the decision should not be limited to 
reverse passing off cases.80 Instead of narrowly and formalistically 
limiting Dastar to claims of “origin,” courts should also apply it to 
assertions that consumers will be confused by intangible content as to 
whether the plaintiff was the “source,” provided “sponsorship,” or was 
“affiliated” with the defendants goods.81 Otherwise, Dastar’s scope 
would be trifling, because plaintiffs would simply recast their claims 
from “origin” to “affiliation” or the like.82 
Dastar includes several interrelated facets relevant to trademark 
rights in 3D printable digital files. First, the decision stands for the idea 
that intellectual origins of goods are irrelevant to trademark law and that 
such concerns should be channeled to copyright law or patent law, if 
anywhere.83 The Court stated, 
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in ac-
cordance with the Act’s common-law foundations (which were not de-
signed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright 
and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the 
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the 
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those 
goods.84 
The Court did not rule out that some consumers might care about a 
product’s intellectual origins (i.e., its authorship), but, like in Wal-Mart, 
the Court made a simplifying rule because it considered those concerns 
comparatively unimportant for trademark law.85 
Second, the Court segregated intangible content from tangible 
goods, stating that trademark law is concerned only with “the producer 
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale.”86 As discussed below, 
this aspect of the decision can hold profound consequences for digital 
content such as 3D printing files.87 
Finally, the decision highlighted trademark law’s limited 
79. Id. at 373-75 (discussing cases); Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and
Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1425 (2017) (discussing cases). 
80. McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 376-80. 
81. Id. at 376. 
82. Id. at 377. 
83. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (emphasis in
original).  
84. Id. 
85. McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 372. 
86. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Of course, trademark law broadly includes service marks, which
involve intangible services. But Dastar did not concern service marks. 
87. See infra Section III.
14
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boundaries and reiterated its holdings in Wal-Mart and TrafFix, 
including their solicitous view of copying. The Court emphasized that 
Wal-Mart’s “carefully considered limitation” (i.e., that product design 
cannot be inherently distinctive) “would be entirely pointless if the 
‘original’ producer could turn around and pursue a reverse-passing-off 
claim under exactly the same provision of the Lanham Act.”88 The Court 
recognized that a broad reading of “origin” would support the plaintiff’s 
suit rejected in TrafFix, stating that the “plaintiff, whose patents on 
flexible road signs had expired, and who could not prevail on a trade-
dress claim under § 43(a) because the features of the signs were 
functional, would have had a reverse-passing-off claim for unattributed 
copying of his design.”89 
Indeed, TrafFix contained hints of a constitutional dimension to the 
functionality doctrine by invoking Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc.90 and emphasizing the role of a broad public domain when 
patent or copyright law does not apply or has expired.91 The Court 
refused to tackle that question, but left the possibility open to consider it 
in the future.92 At a minimum, TrafFix demonstrates the Court’s 
willingness to transpose a policy concern for a robust public domain in 
federal preemption cases into cases solely concerning federal law. Some 
even argue that TrafFix “suggests a limit on Congress’s power to rely on 
other constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause, to remove 
product features from the public domain.”93 
Dastar greatly amplified TrafFix’s policy predilections by invoking 
Bonito Boats and related cases. In explaining why the Lanham Act 
88. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36-37. 
89. Id. at 37. 
90. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Bonito Boats was largely about federal preemption based on
intellectual property laws, but it used strong language in favor of a robust public domain that 
scholars understand to articulate a Constitutional dimension to the argument that unpatentable 
utilitarian product features should be in the public domain. See Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the 
Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 79, 141 (2004).  
91. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also 
Barrett, supra note 90, at 137-46 (2004) (discussing this distinction and citing relevant case law). 
Cf. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade 
Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 618-27 (1996). 
92. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35 (“TrafFix and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of
the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent 
from claiming trade dress protection. We need not resolve this question. If, despite the rule that 
functional features may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade 
dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be time enough to 
consider the matter.”) (citations omitted). 
93. Barrett, supra note 90, at 141. 
15
Osborn: Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
880 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:865 
should not conflict with copyright and patent law, the Court recalled 
several of its cases, all of which favor a robust public domain.94 As a 
result, scholars and courts have largely understood the Dastar Court’s 
broad purpose in fashioning the boundaries between trademark law and 
other IP.95 
Collectively, Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar stand for the clear 
proposition that “trademark law will be applied sparingly, if at all, and 
only in the context of strong inhibitory presumptions, to create exclusive 
rights in matter that the public has a right to copy.”96 The decisions 
approvingly bless many forms of copying as normal and advantageous. 
Moreover, the decisions represent trademark law’s turn away from a 
proprietary rights paradigm and toward a consumer protection 
rationale.97 
III. TRADEMARK BOUNDARIES AND 3D PRINTING
Keeping the Supreme Court’s emphasis on beneficial copying and 
strong boundaries between branches of IP law in mind, this Article now 
turns to the application of trademark law to 3D printing technology. 
At the outset, this Article must address the rather prosaic 
application of trade dress law to 3D printed goods. Surprisingly, scholars 
have intimated that 3D printing’s most profound impacts will be directed 
toward trade dress, as opposed to trademarks. For instance, Professors 
Desai and Magliocca state that, other than patents and copyright, the 
“final type of intellectual property that is ripe for disruption by 3D 
94. The Court stated: 
The problem with this argument according special treatment to communicative products
is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses
that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copy-
right has expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired] including
the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.” 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964); see also Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 121-122 (1938). “In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copy-
ing.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29 (2001). The
rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,” Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 150-151 (1989), under which,
once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution. 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003). 
95. See McKenna, Next Stand, supra note 78, at 377-81 (interpreting Dastar and citing
cases). 
96. Halpern, supra note 65, at 270. 
97. Id. at 271. 
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printing is trade dress.”98 It is true that 3D printing will facilitate the 
manufacturing of uniquely shaped objects and the copying of those 
objects. But I consider these phenomena comparatively less interesting 
because they do not challenge trademark doctrine in any unique way. 
That is, the law will apply to the 3D printed shape the same way it 
applies to the injection-molded or hand-crafted shape. 3D printing may 
increase the frequency of trade dress issues, but the issues will not differ 
in kind in any way unique to trade dress. 
3D printing’s more profound effects on trademark law, including 
but not limited to trade dress law, result from consumers’ disassociation 
of product design from product manufacturing (a phenomenon that 
recalls Wal-Mart’s discussion of product design) and their ability to 
create, copy, and exchange digital files that embody product design.99 
Trademark law’s origins lie almost exclusively in concerns related to 
manufacturing and ownership of physical goods.100 The manufacturer 
affixed the trademark to the manufactured good (or allowed a merchant 
to do the same) to indicate responsibility for manufacturing quality, and 
consumers relied on it for the same purpose.101 
A world of 3D printing commoditizes manufacturing: it can occur 
either in the individual home or at a 3D printing shop selected by the 
end-user.102 Consumers no longer expect a physical object to emanate 
from an anonymous source; the consumer can control the manufacturing 
source. In this way, 3D printing demystifies trademarks, and perhaps 
brands more generally, as consumers no longer associate trademarks 
with manufacturing prowess.103 The ramifications of this shift are 
98. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the
Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1709 (2014) (emphasis added); see also Amanda 
Scardamaglia, Flashpoints in 3D Printing and Trade Mark Law, 23 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 30 (2015) 
(leading the substantive legal discussion with a focus on trade dress protection).  
99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000). 
100. See, e.g., FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING 
TO TRADE-MARKS 20-63 (1925); FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 
22 (1860) (stating that the fundamental policy of trademark law was “to protect the manufacturer, 
who by his skill and industry, has produced an article of merchandise, that has found favor with the 
public, and which he has designated by a particular name or mark.”). Cf. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37 
(holding that “origin of goods” refers only to the “producer of the tangible goods that are offered for 
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods”). 
101. UPTON, supra note 100, at 22.
102. See, e.g., THINGIVERSE, thingiverse.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) which will print
objects for users if the user provides the digital file. 
103. That is not to say some trademark owners will not seek to manufacture their own goods.
Rather, the mere presence of multiple manufacturing options severs the historical assumed 
connection between trademarks and manufacturing source. There exists a rough analogy to the 
merchandizing cases in which logos of sports teams or universities adorn all sorts of clothing and 
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profound, and point to an environment where trademark law has 
decreased salience for the content of digital files. 
Consider the 3D printable files available on numerous websites, 
such as the files on Turbosquid’s website that will print all sorts of 
branded content.104 When a user goes to Turbosquid’s website, she is 
greeted with thousands of files, many containing trademarks in their 
content. One such file is of a model of a Chevrolet truck, complete with 
internal trademarks appearing on the (digital) car just as on a “real” 
Chevy truck. The website will usually have an indication that the file 
was created by a particular entity, such as “HKV Studios.” In the image 
below of a Chevrolet truck, the creator’s name is listed near the top-right 
corner, below the item description.105 
accessories, which were relatively easy to manufacture. People often bought the clothes not 
understanding the logo to indicate source, but merely desiring to express loyalty to the team or 
school. Trademark law grew to police much of this activity through the unwieldy concepts of 
sponsorship or affiliation confusion, but not without growing pains and continuing dissent. See, e.g., 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 31; Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 413, 448-49 (2010) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion]. 3D 
printing technology decentralizes and commoditizes manufacturing to a much greater extent than t-
shirt and baseball hats, and thus sponsorship or affiliation doctrines should not be blithely applied 
without scrutiny. 
104. Recall that BMW sued Turbosquid for hosting and selling digital models of BMW cars
(though these were not 3D printable. Josh Mings, BMW Group Sues Turbosquid for Selling 3D 
Models of Their Car Designs, SOLIDSMACK (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.solidsmack.com/cad-
design-news/bmw-group-sues-turbosquid-for-selling-3d-models-of-their-car-designs/. 
 105.  Image captured from 2016 Chevrolet Silverado, TURBOSQUID, 
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-2016-chevrolet-silverado-model/984941 on November 
25, 2016 (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). This particular file is not 3D printable, but numerous files are. 
Because, as explained below, the 3D printable Ford model truck did not include an artist’s name, I 
did not use the image here. 
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When a shopper on Turbosquid’s website encounters the Chevy 
mark in the file, what does it signify: the origin of the content of the 
digital file (i.e., the idea of a Chevy truck) or the origin or sponsorship of 
the file itself? Given the website’s context, the Chevy mark on the truck 
does not suggest the origin of the actual file, but only the origin of the 
content or idea embodied in the file. The website environment as a 
whole tells a reasonable user that Turbosquid either creates the files or 
hosts others’ creations. Indeed, Turbosquid’s website, by stating that the 
file is created “by HKV Studios,” unmistakably tells the consumer that 
HKV Studios is the origin of the file.106 With this information in hand, a 
reasonable user would understand the file’s title, “2016 Chevrolet 
Silverado,” to be nominative fair use as to what type of automobile the 
model is based on.107 How else could a user seeking a model of a 2017 
Chevrolet Silverado easily find one? In the vast majority of other digital 
files, the context will likewise show that the files originate from 
someone other than the owner of the trademarks appearing within the 
file. In fact, some websites, like thepiratesbay.org, convey rebellion 
against brand owners. 
A similar understanding as to source, sponsorship, and affiliation 
indication drove the Dastar decision. The logic was so compelling that 
Dastar created a bright-line rule, holding that “origin” for purposes of 
the Lanham Act refers only to the origin of tangible goods.108 Fox 
wanted the intangible content (the movie footage) to signify the physical 
tapes’ origins, but the Court refused. The Court decided that trademark 
law’s purposes were ill-served when applied to intangible content.109 In 
the context of 3D printable files, Dastar bars a Lanham Act claim to the 
extent an internal trademark merely refers to the origin of the intangible 
106. Id. The text on the right-hand side of the image shows that Turbosquid included a
disclaimer that GM did not authorize the use of the Chevy logo. This disclaimer further dispels any 
possible confusion at the point of sale, but should not be necessary as discussed herein. Similarly, 
purchasers of files likely do not view the marks appearing in the file as indicating sponsorship or 
affiliation, but rather as a necessary incident to verisimilitude. See infra note 120 and accompanying 
text. 
107. Nominative fair use arises when a third party uses another’s trademark out of necessity to 
describe the third party’s own product or service. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 
1139, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the sale of collectibles bearing the name and likeness of 
Princess Diana was a nominative fair use); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 
F.3d 211, 218-21 (3d Cir. 2005) (establishing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense).
108. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 60 (2003). Recall the
Court also adopted a bright-line rule in Wal-Mart based on the belief that any exception to the rule 
was not significant enough to warrant a doctrinal trademark response. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000). 
109. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. 
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content of a file, as opposed to the origin of the file itself. 
This result may sound shocking to those accustomed to a 
permission culture in which any use of a mark other than the most 
obvious nominative use seemingly requires the trademark owner’s 
authorization. But the result follows naturally from the overarching 
channeling principles of Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar. Those 
decisions emphasize that there are certain uses of a trademark—
sometimes even source-identifying uses—that are simply not the 
concern of trademark law. Where a mark conveys primarily intellectual 
origin as opposed to origin, affiliation, or sponsorship of the file itself, 
trademark law should not forbid the use. 
Dastar represents the most directly applicable case to printable files 
because, although the Dastar films were tangible, the allegedly source-
identifying content was not. Likewise, 3D printable files (as stored on a 
memory medium) can be considered tangible, but their content, even the 
trademarks appearing within the file, are not. It is of course possible for 
courts to interpret Dastar narrowly to apply only to creative intangible 
content, such as a movie, as distinct from an actual trademark appearing 
in intangible content. But that is not what Dastar said, and it is not the 
best reading of Dastar. Such a reading of Dastar would forbid one from 
publicly showing a full-length movie that has entered the public domain 
merely because a movie studio’s trademark appears at the movie’s 
beginning and ending. 
None of this is to say that digital files are per se immune from 
trademark infringement analysis. Some consumers will care about the 
source of the digital file they purchase.110 They may want to ensure that 
the file will actually print a quality version of the object,111 or they may 
want the prestige or the peace of mind from having the “original” or 
“authorized” version.112 Trademark policy applies most forcefully where 
consumers are confused into buying an item, even a file, wrongfully 
believing it to have originated from a particular source. This again raises 
110. See, e.g., Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1713 (“Many people will want to buy
from a brand that . . . guarantees safe files.”). 
111. If a file contains certain errors, those errors will manifest in the printed version of the
object. Errors can include fundamental design errors (such as locating a car’s fuel tank too close to 
an area that would suffer damage in a car crash, thus risking fire) and essentially typographical 
errors (such as accidentally drawing a piece the wrong shape).  
112. Consider the continued popularity of “real” diamonds, even though virtually
indistinguishable human-made diamonds have existed for years. See, e.g., Sri Jegarajah, Would You 
Buy a ‘Man-Made’ Diamond?, CNBC (Apr. 16, 2013, 8:50 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100647697 (quoting a De Beers employee as stating, “The majority of 
consumers have told us during extensive independent research that they want the real thing and 
aren’t prepared to settle for anything less.”). 
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the question of how consumers obtain information about source with 3D 
printable files and requires careful distinction between the source of the 
file itself and the source of the intellectual creation depicted in the file. 
With digital files, source or affiliation indication occurs primarily 
from sources external to the file. Where file creation is easy and 
widespread, external source indication will play an important role, a role 
consonant with trademark law policies. If a digital file provider created a 
website that looked as if it was owned or endorsed by General Motors, 
consumers would likely be confused as to the source or affiliation of the 
files for sale thereon. Also, if Turbosquid were to state that the digital 
file of the Chevy truck depicted above was “created by General Motors,” 
when in fact it was not, trademark infringement clearly would exist.113 
For an example of potentially actionable trademark infringement, look 
closely at the text on the image below of a 3D printable Ford truck 
model on Turbosquid’s website.114 
Notice that, unlike the Chevy truck example, there is no indication in the 
top-right corner of who created the file. Moreover, the assertion that the 
file represented an “officially licensed product” of Ford constitutes 
trademark use external to the file that is likely to cause consumer 
113. A more nuanced situation involves the labeling of the file a “2016 Chevrolet Silvarado”, 
but this is nominative use given the surrounding context. 
114. Image captured from All-New Ford F-150 Raptor STL, TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3ds-all-new-f-150-raptor-stl/933073 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017). 
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confusion if the statement is not true. 
Although Turbosquid found it advantageous to enter into a 
licensing agreement with Ford when offering these files, that does not 
mean trademark law would require a license.115 Indeed, the trio of 
Dastar, Wal-Mart, and TrafFix suggest that the internal content of a 3D 
printable file is unlikely to cause confusion as to source or affiliation. 
Dastar in particular speaks with force against presuming consumer 
associations derived from the internal content of a file. Dastar does not 
represent a physicalist view of trademark law, that is, a view that 
property rights can only exist in relation to a physical object.116 Rather, it 
demonstrates the Court’s belief that a bright-line between the origins of 
tangible goods and intangible content best establishes, or at least best 
approximates, the proper role of trademark law. 
The following subsections offer an apology for channeling the 
internal content of 3D printable files away from trademark infringement. 
In the process, I analyze how and when 3D printing technology 
challenges assumptions about trademark law’s normative objectives. The 
analysis provides a foundation for analyzing not just 3D printable files, 
but all digital files. 
A. Consumer Protection Rationale
Dastar’s focus on tangible goods to the exclusion of a digital file’s
content accords with the consumer protection rationale of trademark law. 
This rationale posits that trademark law exists to improve the quality of 
information in the marketplace, thereby protecting consumers from 
being deceived into buying products they did not mean to and generally 
reducing consumer search costs.117 In the context of physical goods, I 
buy a good bearing a trademark I know and like because I believe it has 
been manufactured by or on behalf of the same source and will be of the 
same quality as other goods bearing a similar mark. 
But as already described, this rationale breaks down in the context 
of printable files. Where the website’s context suggests that “HKV 
Studios” created the digital file, a consumer is not confused as to 
whether GM created the file. Of course the consumer recognizes the 
Chevy mark, but mere recognition of a mark does not prove 
115. I do not analyze dilution in this Article.
116. Cf. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 331-32 (1980) 
(characterizing Blackstone’s view of property as physicalist). 
117. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 417. 
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confusion.118 The mark is present to make the model look like a “real” 
Chevy truck, but that does not mean that GM created the model.119 
Nor does the logo signify meaningful sponsorship or affiliation, 
except perhaps under circular reasoning or a broad definition of those 
terms.120 Where numerous artists compete to make quality digital 
versions of real-world objects, logos “inside” the digital file become a 
necessary ingredient to verisimilitude. Consumers do not buy the file 
because they think GM sponsored it; they buy it because they want 
something that looks like a GM car. As long as the external context does 
not claim sponsorship or affiliation in a manner material to 
consumers,121 the verisimilitude exists for reasons related to healthy 
118. Some cases are to the contrary. See Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 
(1975) (“The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols 
were in plaintiffs satisfies the [confusion] requirement of the [Lanham Act]. The argument that 
confusion must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where 
the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem.”). 
But see Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1983) 
(“There is no evidence that the consumer cares who has made the soft goods or whether they were 
made under license.”). Regarding digital files, a rough parallel can be drawn to cases where marks 
are used in art, because contextually consumers and viewers of the artwork do not normally assume 
the trademarks indicate source or affiliation. See, e.g., University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. 
New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) (relying on a balancing of First Amendment and 
trademark concerns to find no trademark infringement in painting); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 
332 F.3d 915, 928-29 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 
1216 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting in dicta that because artist Andy Warhol’s painting of common goods 
“does not use the trademarked names or product designs to identify the source of the painting, his 
use does not imply endorsement of the artwork by either Campbell’s or Coca–Cola”). 
119. 3D printing files have been analogized to blueprints. If I buy a blueprint for making a
particular branded good from you, the presence of the trademark in the blueprint doesn’t tell me the 
source of the blueprint. Further, if the blueprint bears the legend, “created by [you],” I know you are 
the origin.  
120. Regarding a broad reading of sponsorship or affiliation, the broadest definitions would
swallow dilution. Regarding circular reasoning, the law can be a significant factor to shape 
consumer expectations such that, in circular fashion, if the law repeatedly gives trademark holders 
remedies on an assumption of consumer expectations, the expectations will eventually come into 
being. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 396-97; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, 
Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 315-16 (2013); Lemley & McKenna, 
Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 438-42; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion 
in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 912 (2007). Cf. Felix Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (speaking to property-
like protections for trademarks more generally and stating “The vicious circle inherent in this 
reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of 
actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally 
protected”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990). 
121. Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 448-49 (arguing that
confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation should only be relevant where they are material to 
consumers’ decisions). Marketing literature suggests that even if consumers were to have a bad 
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competition. Inside the digital file, trademarks are the coin of 
competition, not tools for deception. 
Even in jurisdictions that might presume, contrary to reality for 
most digital files, that a trademark in the digital file indicates 
sponsorship or affiliation, a website operator can devise the appropriate 
disclaimer. Indeed, the Turbosquid example of the Chevy truck included 
a disclaimer. It is true that not all disclaimers, particularly inconspicuous 
ones, are effective.122 But no court has infantilized consumers so much 
as to hold that no disclaimers are effective.123 Nevertheless, under 
current law, courts doubt the efficacy of disclaimers and often put the 
burden of proving their efficacy on the defendant.124 Where material 
confusion is already unlikely without disclaimers, the law’s dubiousness 
towards them tends to suppress competition. 
Disclaimers should generally not be required because 3D printing 
technology decouples trademarks as indicators of manufacturing source 
by severing the historical connection between design and manufacturing. 
In this environment, the consumer protection rationale suggests turning 
the focus away from the appearance of the object, including any 
trademarks thereon, and toward the external indicia of the file’s 
source.125 As discussed, even if a 3D printable file of a widget includes a 
(digital) trademark in its content, that does not by itself lead to consumer 
confusion about who created or endorsed the file. Without confusion at 
the point of sale, trademark law’s fundamental policy concern is 
generally not triggered.126 
experience with a digital file they believe is sponsored or affiliated with a trademark owner, they 
would not impute that disappointment to the core (physical) product. See id. at 430-35. 
122. See, e.g., Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a disclaimer in “minuscule print” did “not effectively eliminate the misleading 
impression conveyed in the ad’s large headline”); Shell Co. (Puerto Rico) Ltd. v. Los Frailes 
Service Station, Inc., 605 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that gas station’s disclaimer signs 
“were not prominently displayed”).  
123. See, e.g., HBO, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir.
1987) (“In many circumstances a disclaimer can avoid the problem of objectionable infringement by 
significantly reducing or eliminating consumer confusion by making clear the source of a 
product.”). 
124. See id. at 1316. 
125. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing external indicia of a file’s
source). 
126. See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 513
(6th Cir. 2013) (“No harm is done to this incentive structure, however, by the copying of a product 
design that does not confuse consumers as to the product’s source. . . . [T]rademark law, like the law 
of unfair competition of which it is a part, focuses not on copying per se, but on confusion.”); 
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir.1917) (“The plaintiff has the 
right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his wares which in fact 
are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the 
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On the other hand, given the ease with which people can create 
design files, trademark law in some ways becomes more important in a 
digital world. As design files proliferate, the search cost reductions that 
trademarks bring become proportionally more important. But courts 
must be careful to apply trademark law to source indicators that are 
actually material to consumers.127 Consumers will sometimes care who 
created the digital file and should be able to rely on a source indicator 
(such as the user name of the person or company who created the file or 
the name of the web host) for that information. An entity’s reputation for 
creating or hosting quality files will be important to consumers sifting 
through a sea of files. But consumers will look for these important 
indicia outside of the file’s content. 
Even assuming no point of sale confusion, however, trademark law 
has extended consumer protection to confusion arising after the sale. In a 
typical scenario, buyers of tangible items knowingly buy knockoff goods 
at a flea market or a “Canal street” and there is no confusion at the point 
of sale.128 Courts have dealt with the lack of confusion in flea market 
sales and the like by creating the doctrine of post-sale confusion.129 The 
doctrine typically posits that although the initial purchaser is not 
confused, third party bystanders will see the purchaser wearing/using the 
fake good and will be confused about its source.130 The Supreme Court 
has never endorsed the doctrine, and it is often criticized.131 
Even accepting the post-sale confusion doctrine with physical 
other hand, may copy plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail: but he may not 
represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”). 
127. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 27, at 483 (“[C]ourts should focus the confusion analysis on 
material information, defined as information about a product that will influence consumer buying.”). 
128. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005). 
129. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 152-53. Some courts think 
Congress intended to endorse post-sale confusion when it amended the Lanham Act in 1962 to 
remove reference to deceiving “purchasers,” thus prohibiting any use “likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773 
(1962) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000)); see, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point 
Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 
(6th Cir. 1991). Courts are reading too much into the 1962 amendment, as its purpose was to ensure 
that the Lanham Act provision “relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4, 8 (1961); See Lunney, supra note 27, at 469-75. 
130. See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 778-94 (2012) (discussing
three strands of post-sale confusion jurisprudence). 
131. See, e.g., id. at 776 (proposing that “post-sale confusion doctrine should be discarded
entirely”). Some courts have applied the doctrine with an apparent lack of enthusiasm. See Gibson 
Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s post-sale confusion argument because the accused guitars were not “clearly inferior” to 
the plaintiff’s).  
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goods, it is inapposite to 3D printable files. In many instances, the 
purchaser or transferee of the file will 3D print it and perhaps use the 
printed item in public. The bystanders who are the allegedly confused 
party in post-sale confusion, however, are not seeing the thing (the file) 
that the purchaser bought. Instead, they are seeing something very 
different: the physical object made from a combination of the file, a 3D 
printer, and the material used in printing. Even if the bystanders are 
confused, they are not confused by the thing (the file) the seller 
transferred to the buyer. It is analogous to a seller who sells a blueprint 
or raw materials to a second party who then creates the infringing goods. 
In each situation, post-sale confusion is not applicable.132 
The distinction between a 3D printed object and its corresponding 
digital file, and that distinction’s effect on a post-sale confusion analysis, 
represents one of the most provocative challenges 3D printing 
technology poses to trademark policy. But it has gone completely 
unnoticed in the literature.133 Brand owners will need to rely on indirect 
infringement, with its limitations, to attempt to stop the seller of the 
file.134 
Printed instantiations of the files should not factor into a post-sale 
confusion analysis for a second fundamental reason. Specifically, when 
3D printing technology is mature and ubiquitous, the relationship 
between design and manufacturing is severed such that the appearance 
of a physical good will not generally speak to a single design-and-
manufacturing source.135 The quality of a physical good will speak as 
much to the wearer’s choice of 3D printer as to the CAD file that 
contained the printing instructions. Moreover, the facility with which 
users can alter CAD files further disassociates physical goods from their 
design source.136 
132. But see General Motors Co. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, No. 2:06–CV–00133 BSJ, 2010 WL
5395065 (D. Utah Dec. 27, 2010) (finding body kits that the user bought and attached to a truck to 
make it look like a Hummer gave rise to post-sale confusion). Cf. Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche 
Automibili E Corse v. Roberts, 739 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding a kit-car for a Ferrari 
lookalike infringed, but not mentioning post-sale confusion). The kit car cases, even if properly 
decided, can be distinguished because the seller sold a physical item used directly by the buyer. 
133. Scholars have, however, noted how 3D printing changes consumer perception of source
and the corresponding effects on post-sale confusion, which is discussed in the following paragraph. 
See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1710-11; James Grace, Note, The End of Post-Sale 
Confusion: How Consumer 3D Printing Will Diminish the Function of Trademarks, 28 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 263, 275-80 (2014).  
134. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of indirect infringement. 
135. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 98, at 1711; Grace, supra note 133, at 278. 
136. A proponent of strong trademark protection could argue for the opposite. If 3D printing
makes the public less sure about the manufacturing origins of a good, then trademark law should 
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In other instances, a purchaser or transferee of a file may not 3D 
print a physical version. Instead, the buyer may offer the file for sale (or 
for free) to others. In that case, too, post-sale confusion does not apply. 
The original seller will not be guilty of direct infringement137 based on a 
post-sale confusion analysis because the purchaser/reseller is not selling 
the exact file that the original seller transferred to her. Rather, the 
purchaser/reseller is selling a copy of the file. The original seller is 
analogous to someone who sells a knock-off baseball hat at a swap meet. 
If the buyer uses that hat as the basis to make ten more identical hats, the 
original seller cannot be liable as a direct infringer for the ten hats the 
buyer subsequently created. In short, post-sale confusion only applies to 
the item sold or transferred, not to copies of it. 
Some might argue that downstream copies of digital files should 
count as post-sale confusion because intermediate purchasers can easily 
copy the digital files. But this would usurp the doctrine of indirect 
infringement. Further, in the patent context the Supreme Court has 
strictly distinguished between copies of files versus original files. In 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,138 the Supreme Court analyzed § 271(f) 
of the Patent Act, which basically renders anyone an infringer who 
exports either the unassembled components of a claimed invention or 
those components that have no substantial non-infringing uses.139 AT&T 
claimed that the master software disks Microsoft sent overseas infringed 
its patent claim that required the combination of a physical computer and 
the software.140 Because the software only represented a component of 
the claimed combination, AT&T sought relief under § 271(f).141 There 
was one problem: Microsoft did not load the exported master disks 
directly onto computers; instead, it made copies of the master disks and 
combined the copy with a computer.142 
The Court thought it vitally important that the software Microsoft 
exported was not loaded onto the computers, and thus the Court found 
Microsoft did not infringe.143 Instead, only a copy had been combined 
police printed goods assiduously so as to preserve the information transmission policy for finished 
goods. From a practical standpoint, stopping all or most individualized 3D printed products is 
probably impossible. From a theoretical perspective, the argument raises normative issues regarding 
trademark-as-property arguments, some of which are discussed in the following subsection.  
137. As discussed infra, the seller may be liable for indirect infringement.
138. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)-(2) (2012). 
140. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 442, 446. 
141. Id. at 442. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 453-54. The Court’s decision was influenced in part by the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.  
27
Osborn: Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
892 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:865 
with the computer to form the patented invention.144 AT&T argued that 
distinguishing between the original and the copy created a “loophole” 
for software makers because copying software is effortless, but the Court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that any loophole “is properly left for 
Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action warranted.”145 
Analogously, in the trademark context, copies of files (and prints of 
digital files) should not factor in to any post-sale confusion analysis 
because they are distinct entities from the thing originally sold. 
In sum, Dastar’s instruction to shift focus away from files’ digital 
content is consonant with trademark law’s consumer protection 
rationale. Properly understood and applied, the ruling preserves the 
integrity of the marketplace while fostering creativity and competition. 
In addition, as the next subsection discusses, the holding maintains 
calibrated incentives for producers to invest in making quality goods. 
B. Producer Incentive Rationale
The second primary trademark law pillar—the producer incentive
rationale—can likewise justify channeling the internal content of 3D 
printable files away from trademark law. Or, at least a version of the 
rationale can. Generally, the producer incentive rationale posits that 
trademark law incentivizes companies to invest in manufacturing high-
quality goods by allowing the trademark holder to control use of the 
mark in certain circumstances, thereby protecting consumers’ 
associations between the high-quality goods and the producer.146 This 
view is associated with a property-centric view of trademark law. But 
the doctrinal contours of a property-centric view of trademark law 
depend greatly on one’s conception of property as applied to 
trademarks.147 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 457. 
146. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (stating that
trademark law lowers consumer search costs because it “quickly and easily assures a potential 
customer that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly 
marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a 
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards 
associated with a desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourage[s] the production of quality 
products’ . . . .”) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 2.01[2]) (emphasis added except as to the 
word “this”); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 512 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (stating that trademark law “incentivizes manufacturers to create robust brand 
recognition by consistently offering good products and good services, which results in more 
consumer satisfaction”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 179 (2003); Osborn, supra note 14, at 582.  
147. See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896. 
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Specifically, traditional trademark law viewed the property right as 
a right to customer patronage, or put differently, the right derived from 
the use of a trademark in connection with a business, and the property 
was the goodwill.148 Under this view of trademark law, digital file 
creators and hosts do not trade on the goodwill associated with 
trademarked tangible goods. Trading on this sort of goodwill would 
require meaningful confusion. Consumers do not associate Ford’s 
goodwill from its car business with the digital file because consumers 
are not confused that they are buying a Ford car when they purchase a 
digital model of the car. Even where the 3D printable file will print the 
exact good sold (rather than a model), as long as consumers are not 
confused as to the source of the file, customer patronage is not coopted. 
In addition, the relevant incentive was to produce—that is, to 
manufacture—high-quality goods.149 Under this version of the producer 
incentive theory, “3D printing will explode the dividing line between the 
consumer protection and producer incentive rationales by giving 
individuals the ability to print a remarkable range of fake trademarked 
goods in the privacy of their own homes.”150 In other words, where 
production is decentralized and commoditized, consumers no longer 
equate the quality of production with a trademark owner, unless the 
consumer has special reason to believe that the mark owner actually 
produced the particular item.151 Thus, any sales of digital files will not 
harm the mark owner’s incentive to manufacture quality tangible 
goods.152 
148. Id. at 1884-86.
149. As to the emphasis on incentivizing quality production, see sources cited in note 146,
supra. See also Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“A mark must perform the function of distinguishing the producer . . . of a good . . . in 
order to have any legitimate claim to protection.”) (emphasis added). 
150. Osborn, supra note 14, at 583. 
151. There is room under this theory to argue that trademark owners need incentive to produce 
high-quality digital files. But courts should be careful to distinguish between the quality of files 
versus the quality of the designs embodied in the files. The former might speak to whether the 
object’s lines are drawn well and whether the 3D mesh is “water tight.” See, e.g., Jeff LaMarche, 
Preparing Blender Files for 3D Printing, SHAPEWAYS, 
http://www.shapeways.com/tutorials/prepping_blender_files_for_3d_printing (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017). The latter speaks to things outside of trademark law, as the next paragraph in the text 
demonstrates. Even where there is need for good file quality, the trademark owner is only likely 
harmed by third parties’ poor quality files if consumers believe the mark owner created or controls 
the quality of the files. See Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 30, at 174. But the 
website’s context will usually make clear that another entity made the file. Mere sponsorship or 
affiliation confusion, even if it exists, does not lead consumers to view the brand owner negatively. 
Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 103, at 436-39. 
152. It might be argued that a trademark owner could lose incentive to produce quality goods
if it could not control 3D printable files that will print physical objects similar or identical to the 
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Trademark law’s policy of incentivizing quality manufacturing will 
look increasingly antiquated when manufacturing is largely not in the 
hands of the trademark owner. The purchaser of the file controls the 
manufacturing decision: she may print it at home or select any 
commercial printing services provider. There may be a continued need 
to incentivize quality design, which can be captured in a 3D printable 
file, but utility patents, design patents, and to a lesser extent, copyrights 
exist for just that purpose.153 Applying trademark law to incentivize 
product design generally, as opposed to protecting secondary meaning in 
trade dress, would represent a wholesale policy change for trademark 
law. Such a change would appear unnecessary in light of other IP 
protection that is already available.154 Moreover, the Constitution might 
forbid such a focus, since the IP clause specifies that patents and 
copyrights should incentivize utilitarian and creative design.155 
On the other hand, some modern courts and commentators argue 
for a much different producer incentive focus, one that protects not 
simply existing business, but brands in the abstract.156 Under this view, 
brand owners have a right to control virtually all uses of their 
trademarks, seemingly regardless of meaningful confusion. This view of 
producer protection yields a different doctrinal landscape, one that vastly 
trademark owner’s where those printed objects are deceptively sold to the public. In this 
circumstance, the doctrine of indirect trademark infringement offers the trademark owner 
protection. See infra Section III.D. 
153. Trade dress law can have an incidental effect on encouraging creative design because
trade dress law can exist for an item that is or was covered by a design patent. See Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). But trade dress protection exists primarily to 
prevent consumer confusion.  
154. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (“The law
of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with 
protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of 
‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not 
the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.”) (emphasis added). There are 
some quality design decisions that patent and copyright law will not protect, such as an incremental 
but obvious utilitarian design improvement. But these exist in the realm of free competition and 
may be freely copied, a decision the patent system makes intentionally. KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 
550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“And as progress beginning from higher levels of achievement is 
expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive 
rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the 
progress of useful arts.”). 
155. See supra notes 90-91, 93, and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional
dimensions of TrafFix). 
156. See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 24, at 1896 (“Modern trademark law,
by contrast, seeks to protect brands, construed broadly.”). Ironically, this expanded focus on brands 
in the abstract began not by shifting to a property-centric view of trademark law, but shifting from a 
natural rights property-centric view of trademark law and to a confusion emphasis unconstrained 
from natural rights principles. Id. 
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expands trademark rights. 
C. Socially Beneficial Activity
As one moves away from trademark law’s core prohibition against
deceitful copying, disagreement increases about the limits of the 
incentive and confusion rationales. Many commentators have argued 
that an incentive rationale does not support giving trademark owners the 
maximum incentive to invest in quality goods (or a quality brand), but 
only a socially optimal incentive.157 And some expansions of trademark 
law involve significant costs to society—including deadweight losses 
and restriction on free expression—in exchange for likely minor extra 
incentives to producers.158 The Supreme Court’s trio of Dastar, TrafFix, 
and Wal-Mart highlighted the social desirability of many forms of 
copying, thus signaling a brake on trademark protection’s growth and 
highlighting the distinction between imitation that deceives—which 
trademark law is designed to prevent—and socially beneficial imitation. 
Where neither consumers nor the public have generalized 
expectations that manufactured products emanate from a specific source, 
rather than from a 3D printer, denying non-confused consumers the 
opportunity to obtain printable files and use them to manufacture their 
own goods—even with another’s trademark included—creates 
deadweight losses.159 The non-confusing competition from 3D printable 
files would lower prices for the “original” product, allowing more 
consumers access to it.160 This is even true for rote copying of products 
157. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1046-69 (2005). 
158. See, e.g., id. at 1059-69 (listing costs of IP rights, including deadweight losses, legislative 
rent-seeking, enforcement costs, and diversion from other forms of production); Robert G. Bone, 
Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 
619 (2006) (noting costs of broad trademark rights, including deadweight loss, rent seeking costs, 
and burdens on First Amendment values); Lunney, supra note 27, at 479-84 (discussing costs of 
strong trademark protection and benefits of some forms of copying). 
159. Cf. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170-73 (1948) (criticizing advertisements that create deadweight loss 
based on irrational consumer attachment). These mid-twentieth century critiques fell out of favor 
with the rise of law-and-economics responses questioning a hostile view of advertising. See, e.g., 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 268-75 (1987) (contending that “the hostile view of brand advertising has been largely 
and we think correctly rejected by economists”). But current views continue to recognize the 
deadweight losses resulting from certain trademark protection. Lunney, supra note 27, at 479-81 
(arguing against the myth that trademark protection cannot engender anticompetitive losses); Dogan 
& Lemley, supra note 31, at 481-82 (arguing that a broad merchandising right increases costs 
without a justifiable benefit). 
160. If the original’s prices did not budge, that would suggest the “competition” is not
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down to the finest detail (including marks), which is sometimes frowned 
upon as “free-riding.” But absent meaningful confusion, it is difficult to 
condemn the copying as anything but healthy competition.161 
In many ways, 3D printing highlights refined versions of important 
questions trademark law wrestled with in the first half of the twentieth 
century: 
[Broad trademark protection] enables one to acquire a vested interest in 
a demand “spuriously” stimulated through “the art of advertising” by 
“the power of reiterated suggestion” which creates stubborn habits. 
This poses an important policy question: Should the courts actively 
lend their aid to the making of profits derived from the building of 
such habits, if and whenever those stubborn habits so dominate buyers 
that they pay more for a product than for an equally good competing 
product?162 
Though views toward advertising have softened since the mid-twentieth 
century,163 a similar question must be asked: Whether the law should 
protect branded goods against competition from digital files where 
consumers are generally not confused by the internal indicia of the file? 
Beyond rote copying of a trademark owner’s products, 3D printing 
will engender significant free expression, which trademark law might 
stifle. Mature 3D printing technology will one day “allow a torrent of 
creativity as users create 3D customizations, mash-ups, and parodies of 
trademarked goods.”164 For example, users can design and print a 
handbag that is half Luis Vuitton and half Gucci or can create a 
personalized version of a good bearing another’s trademark. Simple 
examples of creative uses include the following “pumpkin” and 
“pineapple” iPhone cases:165 
affecting the trademark owner. 
161. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc., 167 F.2d 969, 978 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(“[A] ‘free ride,’ without more, is in line with the theory of competition.”); Norwich Pharmacal Co. 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Absent confusion, imitation of certain
successful features in another’s product is not unlawful and to that extent a ‘free ride’ is
permitted.”); Lunney, supra note 27, at 482-83.
162. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l., Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 512 (6th Cir.
2013) (“No harm is done to this incentive structure, however, by the copying of a product design 
that does not confuse consumers as to the product’s source. . . . [T]rademark law, like the law of 
unfair competition of which it is a part, focuses not on copying per se, but on confusion.”); Triangle 
Publ’ns, Inc., 167 F.2d 969, 980 n.13 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting) (quoting Shredded 
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918)). 
163. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 158, at 602-03. 
164. Osborn, supra note 14, at 585. 
165. The pumpkin case was found at Case for iPhone 4 (Pumpkin), TURBOSQUID,
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-model-of-iphone-4-case/916181 (last visited Nov. 30, 
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Using another’s trademark in an expressive work often pits First 
Amendment values against the trademark owner’s private potential harm 
to its mark or brand and the public’s interest in information 
transmission.166 Thus far, courts have engaged in balancing tests to 
decipher whether a particular trademark use in an expressive work is 
allowable.167 The most popular test suggests, in a deceptively simple 
fashion, that the Lanham Act “should be construed to apply to artistic 
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”168 Applying the test is 
easier said than done. But where the use of a symbol does not cause 
significant confusion, as with many instances of 3D printing as 
described above, the balance begins to tip in favor of protecting 
expressive uses of marks, perhaps so much so that a bright-line rule is 
justified. 
Returning again to “rote” copying of another’s trademark-bearing 
good, the issue of protected personal expression is further complicated 
by the increasing recognition that consumers use brands to shape their 
identity and express themselves.169 A litany of commentators describe 
2016), and the pineapple case was found at Case for iPhone 4 (Pumpkin), TURBOSQUID, 
http://www.turbosquid.com/3d-models/3d-iphone-4-case/917065 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
166. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border between Trademarks and
Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 
(2005). 
167. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); Regarding the
difficulties courts have with applying Rogers, see William K. Ford, Restoring Rogers: Video 
Games, False Association Claims, and the “Explicitly Misleading” Use of Trademarks, 16 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 306 (2017). 
168. Id. 
169. E.g., Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 95 (2010) (“Several studies
confirm that consumers incorporate brands into their lives as tools for shaping and expressing their 
own identities, and for perceiving the identities of others. Some brands even serve as objects of cults 
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how, one way or another, strong trademark protections for certain goods 
inhibit the free expression of individuals who would like to associate 
with particular, usually expensive, brands.170 Because status signaling is 
an expressive act, it gives rise to First Amendment concerns.171 
Although an analysis of the First Amendment implications of self-
expressive trademark uses are beyond the scope of this Article,172 it is 
uncontroversial to suggest the analysis is highly complex. 
The upshot is that 3D printable files will often include creative and 
expressive conduct that provides societal benefits and gives rise to First 
Amendment issues. The current First Amendment framework involves 
complex and indeterminate balancing tests that can cripple 
unsophisticated individuals or startups. The costs of uncertainty recall 
the Wal-Mart Court’s sensitivity to litigation costs as a deterrent to 
beneficial activity, when it observed that “[c]ompetition is deterred, 
however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of 
successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently source-
identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged 
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”173 
By analogy, given the unlikelihood that a 3D printable file’s 
and rituals . . . .”) (citations omitted); Barnett, supra note 128, at 1381-86; C. Scott Hemphill & 
Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1176 (2009) 
(noting a “snob effect” whereby “the prevalence of cheaper copies also may reduce demand for the 
original design” because of “a consumer’s desire for distinction from lower-status consumers or 
from other consumers more generally”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: 
Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2007); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, 
Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211 (1986) (“Many persons purchase branded goods for 
the purpose of demonstrating to others that they are consumers of the particular good.”); H. 
Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. 
ECON. 183, 189 (1950). 
170. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 169, at 122; Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 741-42 (2012) (arguing that trademark law is “contemptuous” of low income 
consumers “who would like to purchase what appear to be authentic goods at deeply discounted 
prices” even where there is no confusion as to authenticity, and, by so doing, “trademark law tries to 
ensure that no one can legally possess the status of a brand they cannot afford); Barton Beebe, 
Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010); Michael 
Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 87–94 (2008); Sheff, 
supra note 130, at 803; Hemphill and Suk counter that there is “much more to fashion than status” 
and that the lack of protections for fashion designers (other than copyright, design patent, and 
trademark law) “push[es] creators toward the high-end realm of status and luxury, and away from 
devoting creative resources to design innovation.” Hemphill & Suk, supra note 169, at 1179-80. 
171. Sheff, supra note 130, at 804. 
172. Others have provided such analysis. See Sheff, supra note 130, at 804-28; see also Robert 
C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158 (1982); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008).
173. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000). 
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internal content suggests any meaningful source indication, a bright-line 
rule can circumvent the current costly balancing tests. Dastar supplies 
the bright-line rule for 3D printable files if we interpret its holding to 
preclude analysis of a file’s internal content.174 The resulting certainty 
encourages more of what the Court deems socially beneficial activity. 
While bright-line rules are less flexible than balancing tests,175 the 
certainty of a rule can outweigh the desirability of a more flexible 
analysis.176 Such a rule is likewise consonant with the TrafFix decision, 
which was concerned that the harms to the patent law system from 
overprotecting utilitarian design outweighed any benefit from rare 
instances of consumer confusion.177 
It is important to recognize that a rule like Dastar’s does not leave 
rights holders helpless with respect to printable files. First, trademark 
owners have a clear trademark injury where a consumer is confused by 
external indicia as to the source of the file, such as where a consumer is 
deceived into believing she is downloading a file from the trademark 
owner’s website. Second, any imprecision in the rule, and the resulting 
possible injustice at the margins, is ameliorated by the potential 
availability of other IP protection for some digital files. Just as the Wal-
Mart Court justified its bright-line rule—that product design cannot be 
inherently distinctive—with reference to the producer’s ability to 
“secur[e] a design patent or a copyright for the design,”178 Dastar’s rule 
is justified in part by the protections producers can receive for creative 
works through copyright and design patents and for utilitarian works 
through utility patents. 
Finally, mark owners retain the ability to sue digital file creators 
and distributors on the basis of indirect infringement. The next 
subsection considers this doctrine and its application to printable files. 
174. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003). 
175. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 48, at 421 (discussing the costs and benefits of rules and
standards).  
176. Though the Court was not explicit in its calculus in Dastar, Wal-Mart demonstrates the
Court’s awareness that threats of litigation (and the costs thereof) can stifle creativity. See Wal-
Mart, 529 U.S. at 214; see also James Gibson, supra note 120, at 907-15. Recall that the Court 
adopted a bright-line rule in Wal-Mart, deciding that product design cannot be inherently 
distinctive. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. 
177. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29-30 (2001). Although
the issues with digital files are not as stark as in TrafFix, which dealt with the usurpation of explicit 
patent policy. The concerns with digital files discussed herein would not lead to an extension of a 
patent monopoly, because the seller of the file could simply remove the offending logo. 
Nevertheless, the preservation of a robust domain of unfettered competition remains an important 
concern. 
178. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. 
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D. Indirect Infringement
If digital files do not directly infringe a trademark, trademark
owners can turn to the doctrine of indirect infringement to protect certain 
rights. Under this doctrine, if a party “intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom 
it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, 
the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.”179 
A key requirement of indirect infringement is that there must be an 
underlying act of direct infringement.180 Of course, a non-confused 
purchaser of a file would commit direct trademark infringement if she 
printed copies of the tangible good bearing another’s trademark and sold 
those goods while representing that they are from the trademark owner. 
And if the seller of the file knew the buyer would engage in this activity, 
trademark law’s core policy concerns are triggered and infringement 
should be found. 
But direct infringement will be lacking with many downstream 
uses. If a non-confused transferee of a file merely keeps the file on his 
home computer, there is no actionable confusion. Even where the 
transferee uses the file to print a tangible good for purely personal use, 
trademark law does not reach such personal uses because they are not 
interstate in nature and are not trademark uses “in commerce.”181 
Indirect infringement also requires the distributor to have 
knowledge that the downstream entity will engage in trademark 
infringement. Sometimes that knowledge will be easy to prove, as where 
a syndicate conspires to flood the market with counterfeit 3D printed 
179. Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
180. Id. 
181. Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 588 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 592 (2015) (holding there can be no false designation of origin claim where plaintiff’s actions 
(submitting allegedly misleading architectural plans to city) were entirely local and thus did not 
meet the requirement “that the allegedly false designation enter into and/or have an effect on 
interstate commerce”); Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff’d, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1986) (even assuming defendant publisher’s book catalogs 
falsely indicated that plaintiff’s book had been published by defendant, there could be no liability 
under § 43(a) where defendant did not publish or ship the book because the goods did not enter into 
commerce); Cognotec Services, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York, 862 F. Supp. 45 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Cognotec has failed to allege that any of the infringing materials were 
disseminated ‘in commerce.’ Indeed, the amended complaint makes clear that Morgan developed a 
program to use internally for its currency customers. In other words, Morgan’s program is not 
disseminated ‘in commerce’ as is required by a § 43(a) claim.”) (citation omitted); Osborn, supra 
note 14, at 583, n.190. 
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goods. But as in the patent context,182 many file distributors, including 
websites who host third-party content, will have little knowledge of what 
the downstream users will do with the files and may lack expertise to 
understand whether certain uses are infringing. 
An important question—especially in the digital files context—is 
whether the Supreme Court’s Inwood test applies to an intermediary who 
merely facilitates other parties’ exchanges. The Supreme Court 
articulated its Inwood test in a scenario where the defendant either 
manufactured or distributed the goods directly.183 In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. 
eBay, Inc.,184 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the 
test applied to intermediaries where an intermediary has “more than a 
general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell 
counterfeit goods” and instead has “contemporary knowledge of” 
specific acts that “are infringing or will infringe in the future.”185 The 
Court held that a defendant would satisfy the knowledge requirement if 
it remained willfully blind to the infringement.186 
The Tiffany case holds important safeguards for many 
intermediaries of digital files. It offers a safe harbor for intermediaries 
who remove items that infringe or will infringe in the future. If a 
trademark holder notifies the intermediary of an infringing item on its 
website, the intermediary can avoid liability by removing the item. 
Similarly, the intermediary can monitor its site to search for and remove 
infringing items. In some cases, technology can assist in this process. 
Yet, the Tiffany case has unclear boundaries and it may be difficult for 
many intermediaries to bring themselves comfortably within the safe 
harbor. For instance, the defendant in Tiffany, eBay, had immense 
resources and devoted millions of dollars, sophisticated technology, and 
considerable employee effort to policing infringement on its site.187 
182. Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1333-44 (2015) (outlining difficulties in successfully 
capturing infringers based on an inducement theory). 
183. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
184. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
185. Id. at 107. The defendant in eBay knew in general that some of its online listings were
counterfeit, but it removed any specific listings it knew were infringing. Because it never knowingly 
allowed specific infringing acts to take place, it was not liable as a contributory infringer. Several 
courts have followed this analysis. See, e.g., Spy Phone Labs LLC v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-
3756, 2016 WL 6025469 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 
2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
186. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109-10. 
187. Id. at 97-100 (detailing, inter alia, eBay’s $20 million per year and 4,000 employees
devoted to promote trust and safety on its website, including 200 employees devoted exclusively on 
combating infringement). 
37
Osborn: Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
902 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:865 
Smaller intermediaries could not hope to match eBay’s efforts and 
sophistication, and it is not clear whether courts will use a sliding scale 
based on an intermediary’s resources. 
Indirect infringement will be an important tool to stop those who 
intentionally facilitate confusion using 3D printing technology. At the 
same time, courts should not apply it with too heavy a hand when a web 
intermediary is acting in good faith, but lacks resources for a 
sophisticated policing paradigm. Otherwise, intermediaries will opt to 
shut down or severely curtail their operations rather than face liability 
for unintentional missteps. In that case, society loses the benefit of all 
the non-infringing activity the intermediary forebears because of liability 
fears. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The digital world does not require a wholesale makeover of our IP 
laws. But it does require careful attention to legal policy as applied to 
technological change. 3D printing separates design from manufacturing. 
The technology drastically reconfigures how people interact with brands 
and how they understand design and manufacturing. The contours of a 
world with mature 3D printing are uncertain, and trademark law should 
not be used to stifle the technological possibilities.188 Rather than 
stretching already tenuous doctrines to smother a nascent technology, 
courts should apply trademark law to situations where consumers are 
meaningfully confused and brand owners’ incentives to invest in quality 
goods are materially dampened. 
188. Osborn, supra note 14, at 556-57. 
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